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INTRODUCTION 
 
Diagnostic methods offer a tremendous value to our society, with 
benefits that usually far exceed their costs.  Physicians and laboratory 
technicians use diagnostic methods to determine the presence of dis-
eases or disorders without having to perform expensive surgery.  A 
series of non-invasive steps, such as obtaining a sample from a pa-
tient, running tests on the sample, and interpreting results, is one ex-
ample of a simple diagnostic method that can yield essential treatment 
information.  A recent study shows that, while diagnostic methods 
comprise about 5 percent of hospital costs and about 1.6 percent of all 
Medicare costs, their results may influence up to 60–70 percent of 
health-care decision-making.
1
  There is a noticeably high benefit-to-
cost ratio when performing diagnostic methods that warrants our at-
tention to their future development and implementation in health care. 
  
 1 LEWIN GROUP, THE VALUE OF DIAGNOSTICS INNOVATION, ADOPTION AND 
DIFFUSION INTO HEALTH CARE 147, 148 (July 2005), 
http://www.advamed.org/NR/rdonlyres/61EB858F-EC9E-4FAB-9547-
09DABF7D2A72/0/thevalueofdiagnostics.pdf. 
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Unfortunately, the benefits of diagnostic methods have been    
diminished by increased competition to develop the most lucrative 
tests.
2
  Corporations involved in the diagnostic market have placed a 
“heavy reliance” on obtaining patent protection in order to recoup 
money spent on research and development.
3
  Patents enable corpora-
tions to block their competitors from making or using any diagnostic 
method that is similar to a patented method.
4
  While aggressively 
seeking patent protection may represent a wise business decision on 
behalf of a diagnostic corporation, it does not take into account the 
negative implications for society.  Some diagnostic method patents are 
overly broad and include what is arguably an exclusive right to use the 
human body’s natural pathways or mental faculties.5  These sorts of 
patents hinder the progress of science and medicine by imposing bar-
riers to research and patient treatments that require access to the hu-
man body’s natural functions.6 
While the purpose of the patent system is to enhance social wel-
fare by incentivizing research and development,
7
 the subsequent 
blocking of critical avenues of research and treatment is contrary to 
this purpose, and therefore can be seen as an “unintended effect.”8  
This unintended effect has been acutely recognized by pathology labs, 
which routinely perform patented diagnostic methods in order to study 
disease.
9
  The Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) has stated 
that while patents “are originally intended to provide incentives” to 
conduct basic research, they have, in reality, hindered the growth of 
pathology labs by imposing exorbitant licensing fees.
10
  The Supreme 
  
 2 See John Carrol, Convergence in the Midst of Competition, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 31–32, 38–39 (Dec. 2007). 
 3 See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 62. 
 4 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 5 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 
135–38 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 
(1978)). 
 6 See id. at 126–27 (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede 
rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) (citation omitted). 
 7 STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 39 
(2004). 
 8 See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 62. 
 9 See Barbara A. Zehnbauer, Clinical Testing of Patient’s Specimens, in 
MOLECULAR GENETIC TESTING IN SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 171, 184 (John D. Pfeifer 
ed., 2006) (explaining that these patented diagnostic methods include genetic tests 
and molecular medicine techniques). 
 10 Id. at 184.  Laboratories that use a patented method without paying a li-
censing fee may be served with a cease and desist letter.  See S. Chandrasekharan et 
al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices On Access to Genetic Testing for 
Hereditary Hemochromatosis, 12 GENETICS MEDICINE, S155–S170 (2010).  If they 
create their own internal test similar to the patented method, they may be sued for 
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Court
11
 and the American Medical Association (AMA)
12
 have also 
identified this unintended effect on physicians who are forced to con-
duct extensive patent research before ordering a diagnostic test for a 
patient. 
This Note will attempt to reconcile the traditional role of the pa-
tent system, to provide incentives to invent, with its unintended effect 
of blocking essential avenues of research and treatment.  To achieve 
this end, this Note will focus on what types of diagnostic methods 
should be eligible for patenting.  Clarifying the proper scope of patent 
eligibility should prohibit patents on overly-broad diagnostic methods 
while still retaining traditional incentives to invent.  In Part I, I will 
provide background on common diagnostic methods and the factors 
affecting their development.  In Part II, I will provide background on 
basic patent law principles and the current legal debate over diagnos-
tic method patent eligibility.  In Part III, I will discuss two common 
arguments against granting patents on diagnostic methods.  In Part IV, 
I will discuss the recent Prometheus decision and its effect on patent 
eligibility.  In Part V, I will propose a redefined version of the current 
test for patent-eligible subject matter, the machine-or-transformation 
test, and apply it to the diagnostic method patents at issue in recent 
Federal Circuit cases.   
 
I.   ATTRIBUTES OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 
 
With each passing year, diagnostic methods are becoming more 
accurate, precise, and comprehensive.
13
  While present diagnostic 
methods have already been shown to increase patient health and re-
duce health-care costs,
14
 future tests should provide more effective 
treatments that are better calibrated to treatment risks and perhaps 
even tailored to individual characteristics.
15
  While many diagnostic 
  
infringement.  See 35 U.S.C. §271(a); Lear Siegler Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 
F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing the “Doctrine of Equivalents”). 
 11 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138 (noting that some diagnostic patents may 
“divert resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of searching 
patent files for similar simple correlations”). 
 12 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical Process Patents–
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2036 (2006). 
 13 See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 42. 
 14 See id. at 1; this is generally true when diagnostic tests are accurate.  
Sometimes diagnostics produce “false negative error[s],” where a disease is present 
but undetected, and “false positive error[s],” where a disease is not present but detect-
ed.  Id. at 67–68. 
 15 Id. at 1 (“As such products mature, clinicians and patients will be better 
able to access the risks and benefits of care options and customized health manage-
ment strategies to optimize individual health and quality of life.”).  This has also been 
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methods have yet to be implemented for consumers and health-care 
providers, a few are routinely used today. Common diagnostic meth-
ods used by health-care providers include, but are not limited to, med-
ical imaging, blood assays, and genetic tests.   
 
A.      Examples of Diagnostic Methods 
 
X-ray methods are a form of medical imaging used to diagnose 
bone disorders.  A high frequency electromagnetic signal is transmit-
ted and becomes attenuated as it passes through the body.
16
  The re-
maining signal is captured on film for subsequent analysis.
17
  An   
alternative to X-ray methods is Medical Resonance Imaging (MRI), 
which is used to diagnose disease in soft tissues such as the brain, 
muscles, and heart.
18
  MRI methods involve the application of a mag-
netic field to a patient and the transmission of radio frequency puls-
es.
19
  Resonance energy is emitted by the patient and picked up by a 
receiver that outputs data onto a screen for viewing.
20
  To improve 
image clarity, both X-rays and MRIs involve the oral or intravenous 
administration of a contrast agent to a patient.
21
           
Unlike medical imaging methods, blood assays and genetic tests 
require a physical sample to be extracted from a patient.
22
  Blood  
assays are used to identify immune response deficiencies, drug levels, 
and other forms of disease.
23
  A typical first step is to take a blood 
sample from a patient using a hypodermic syringe and needle.  The 
blood sample is then subjected to a number of tests involving        
  
referred to as the “promise of personalized medicine.”  See Michael O. Leavitt & Raju 
Kucherlapati, Op-Ed, The Great Promise of Personalized Medicine, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 26, 2008, at A19. 
 16 CHEST X-RAY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 15 (Rita Joarder & Neil Crundwell 
eds., 2009). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See GARY LINEY, MRI IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 11 (2006). 
 19 See U.S. Patent No. 6,414,488 (filed Mar. 1, 2000). 
 20 See id. 
 21 CONTRAST-ENHANCED CLINICAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1–2 (Val 
M. Runge ed., 1997); Contrast Agents, AM. SOC’Y RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGISTS, 
https://www.asrt.org/content/ThePublic/AboutRadiologicProcedures/ContrastAgents.
aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
 22 Blood assays and genetic tests are also a form of in vitro diagnostic as they 
are performed on samples extracted from the body.  Medical imagine methods such as 
X-ray and MRI that monitor health within the body are referred to as in vivo diagnos-
tics.  LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 14. 
 23 See R. Hussain et al., Cytokine Profiles Using Whole-Blood Assays Can 
Discriminate Between Tuberculosis Patients and Healthy Endemic Controls in a 
BCG-Vaccinated Population, 264 J. IMMUNOLOGICAL METHODS 95 (2002). 
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reagents.
24
  Test results are analyzed individually by a medical techni-
cian or in quick succession by a machine.
25
  
Genetic tests are more complex than blood assays and are used to 
diagnose diseases which can be traced to genetic alterations.  Myri-
ad’s BRACAnalysis test, for example, is used to diagnose breast can-
cer.
26
  The first step is to take a sample from a patient by drawing 
blood or using a cheek swab or mouthwash.
27
  The sample is then sent 
to Myriad for purification of specific gene fragments, amplification, 
and sequencing.
28
  The sample sequence is compared against a refer-
ence sequence in order to make a diagnosis.
29
    
  
B.   Factors Affecting Diagnostic Method Development   
 
There are three main factors affecting the development of new di-
agnostic methods: administrative regulation, insurance coverage and 
reimbursement policies, and industrial competition.
30
  The FDA regu-
lates diagnostics similarly to medical devices by categorizing them 
into three risk-based classes.
31
  Class I represents minimal potential 
for harm, while Class III includes riskier diagnostics such as HIV test 
kits.
32
  Class III diagnostics are placed under the most regulatory scru-
tiny and may be subject to a pre-market approval process.
33
  
Diagnostics performed in a hospital setting account for 60 percent 
of the diagnostic industry’s revenue;34 therefore their implementation 
is highly dependent on insurance coverage and reimbursement poli-
cies.  Medicare reimbursement policies often affect the policies of 
other medical insurance groups because Medicare is “the largest pur-
chaser of clinical laboratory services in the US.”35  The reimburse-
  
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. Rapid testing of samples with a machine is known as high-throughput 
screening. 
 26 See BRACAnalysis® Questions and Answers, MYRIAD GENETIC 
LABORATORIES, https://www.myriadpro.com/node/109/anchor#brfaq1 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2012). 
 27 Id. 
 28 BRACAnalysis® Technical Specifications, MYRIAD GENETIC 
LABORATORIES 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.myriad.com/lib/technical-
specifications/BRACAnalysis-Technical-Specifications.pdf. 
 29 Id. 
 30 LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 59–63. 
 31 Id. at 60. 
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 27. 
 35 Id. at 61 (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE LABORATORY 
PAYMENT POLICY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 17 (2000)). 
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ment rates set by Medicare for diagnostic methods do not always cor-
respond with development costs, and novel diagnostics are often re-
imbursed at rates similar to outdated tests.
36
  This reimbursement 
structure discourages development and may hinder innovation.
37
           
The third factor affecting diagnostic method development is com-
petition to create the most lucrative diagnostic methods.  The creation 
of novel diagnostic methods involves highly technical research that is 
often risky and expensive.
38
  To offset this risk and increase the 
chance of recouping research and development costs, corporations 
work extremely hard to “protect” their investments through patents.  
Patent protection ensures that the corporations will benefit exclusively 
from the success of their inventions for the life of the patent, which is 
normally twenty years from filing.
39
  Patents reduce the risk inherent 
in technology investments, which can aid in the search for third-party 
funding.
40
  
However, recent judicial developments may threaten corporate re-
liance on patent protection for diagnostic methods.  In June 2010, the 
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos revisited what types of inventions 
should be eligible to receive a patent for the first time in twenty-nine 
years.
41
  The Court expressly invited the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases, to impose new limitations on patent eligibility.
42
  Since Bilski, 
the Federal Circuit has decided two cases which have a bearing on the 
future of diagnostic method patents.
43
  To understand the recent 
changes that have come about in patent law, the next section will pro-
vide background.  
 
 
  
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 62. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Patenting, 
HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1984, at 25, 26 (Dr. Buster, the inventor of surrogate em-
bryo transfer, states that investors would not have funded his research without a 
“chance to profit from their investment via patenting and licensing the products and 
processes . . . .”). 
 41 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010); see Margaret Kubick, An 
Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and Diagnostic Method Patents on 
Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 280–81 (2010). 
 42 Id. at 16. 
 43 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen Idec (Classen II), 659 F.3d 1057, 
1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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II.  BASIC PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE LEGAL DEBATE 
   OVER DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
 
A.    Patent System Foundation 
 
The American patent system consists of a legal framework to   
protect any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or    
composition of matter.”44  Congressional authority over patents is 
granted by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which seeks “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by granting an ex-
clusive right to an inventor on his invention for a limited time.
45
    
Under the utilitarian theory of patent law, this phrase has been       
interpreted to protect only those inventions that enhance the nation’s 
social welfare.
46
  In other words, a patent should provide more      
incentives to create beneficial, new technologies than disincentives to 
do so.  
Four statutory provisions have been enacted to ensure that patents 
enhance the nation’s social welfare and promote science.47  The first 
provision, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (§ 101) defines patent-eligible subject mat-
ter.
48
  Inventions that do not come within the scope of § 101 are 
deemed non-statutory and ineligible for a patent, regardless of their 
other characteristics.  The second provision defines novelty of       
invention and how one may lose her patent rights through specific 
acts.
49
  The third provision defines how inventions must be “non-
obvious” to one having ordinary skill in the art.50  The fourth provi-
sion requires inventions be properly disclosed to the public and     
described well enough that someone can make and use it.
51
 
This Note will focus on the first provision, § 101, and more     
specifically, the first of four enumerated categories within this provi-
sion: “new and useful process[es].”52  This Note will not analyze the 
other three categories of § 101,
53
 nor will it analyze the other three 
  
 44 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).  
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 46 David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: 
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184 
(2009). 
 47 §§ 101–103, 122. 
 48 Id. § 101. 
 49 Id. § 102. 
 50 Id. § 103. 
 51 Id. § 112.  
 52 Id. § 101. 
 53 Id. (The other subject matter categories of § 101 are “any new and useful . 
. . machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof.”). 
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statutory provisions,
54
 each of which can preclude the issuance of a 
patent.  While diagnostic methods may involve the use of a machine 
or a patented drug, there is a single category of patent eligibility for 
the   “process” or method itself, which is removed from the physical     
objects associated with it.  For example, in Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services (Prometheus II),
55
 a laboratory 
owned a method patent on a multi-step metabolites test that optimizes 
the delivery of drugs used to treat a specific autoimmune disease.
56
  
The laboratory’s method patent covers each step of the metabolite 
test, but it does not extend to the drugs themselves, which are        
unpatented and commonly used.
57
  
 
B.   The Legal Debate Over Diagnostic Method Patent 
Eligibility 
 
The history of the Prometheus II decision shows that what       
constitutes a patent eligible diagnostic method is currently up for de-
bate.  In this case, a clinical pathology lab associated with the Mayo 
Clinic in Rochester, NY, purchased and performed Prometheus     
Laboratories’ patented Thiopurine Metabolites test in order to         
optimize the treatment of inflammatory bowel disease.
58
  A common 
problem associated with treating inflammatory bowel disease is that a 
small percentage of patients poorly metabolize thiopurine drugs, 
which can produce toxic side effects.
59
  Prometheus’ Thiopurine    
Metabolites test addresses this problem by minimizing toxic side   
effects unique to a patient’s metabolic response.60  Since this test    
relies on a patient’s individual ability to metabolize an administered 
drug, it can be characterized as a personalized method. 
After years of paying licensing fees, the Mayo Clinic began using 
its own version of the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test at its 
clinics and hospitals.
61
  Prometheus Laboratories sued the Mayo Clin-
  
 54 Id. § 101–103. 
 55 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 56 Id. at 1349–50. 
 57 See id. at 1350. 
 58 See id. at 1351;  see supra Part III.A (for a discussion of Prometheus II in 
greater detail).  
 59 See A.F.Y. Al Hadithy et al., Thiopurines in Inflammatory Bowel Disease: 
Pharmacogenetics, Therapeutic Drug Monitoring and Clinical Recommendations, 37 
DIGESTIVE & LIVER DISEASE 282, 282–83 (2005). 
 60 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1350. 
 61 Id. at 1351. 
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ic for patent infringement.
62
  As a defense, the Mayo Clinic argued 
that the Prometheus patent was invalid because of ineligible subject 
matter.
63
  The district court found that the method patent was invalid, 
but the Federal Circuit reversed (Prometheus I).
64
  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in light of its Bilski decision,
65
 and the case was 
vacated and removed to the Federal Circuit.
66
  On December 17, 2010, 
the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its previous holding that the patent was 
valid.
67
 
The different outcomes reached in Prometheus at the district and 
circuit levels are directly related to two common arguments against 
granting patents on diagnostic methods.  The next section will explain 
these arguments. 
 
III. TWO  COMMON ARGUMENTS  AGAINST DIAGNOSTIC 
METHOD    PATENTS 
 
There are two common arguments against granting patents on   
diagnostic methods.  The first is that diagnostic methods may include 
“laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” (hereinafter 
referred to as “general concepts”), which are commonly excluded by 
patent law.
68
  The second is that granting patents on some diagnostic 
methods may violate medical ethical standards.  The first argument 
has been of particular importance in recent judicial analysis,
69
 while 
the latter has been influential but appears to have lost favor in the 
Federal Circuit.
70
  
 
  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1351–52. 
 64 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581 
F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 65 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 66 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010). 
 67 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1355. 
 68 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (identifying three cate-
gorical exclusions from patent-eligible subject matter). 
 69 See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3229 (Reaffirming the importance of applying the 
traditional three exclusions when evaluating method patents: “In searching for a limit-
ing principle, this Court’s precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas provide 
useful tools.”). 
 70 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 
138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); but cf. Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 & n.3 
(2009) (“[Lab. Corp.’s] dissent is not controlling law and also involved different 
claims from the ones at issue here.”). 
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A. Preemption and the Exclusion of General      
Concepts 
 
When a diagnostic method requires use of the human body’s natu-
ral pathways or mental faculties, there are limited ways that this 
method may be eligible for patenting.
71
 The patent laws tend to dis-
courage any method that incorporates a concept or phenomenon   
within the public domain.  Consider, for example, if a patent was 
granted on a diagnostic method with a step comparing the level of two    
common metabolites (small, molecular products of metabolism) in 
order to infer the presence of a disease.
72
  The patent holder (patentee) 
would have a right to exclude the public from conducting any experi-
ment that includes both steps.  This overly broad patent would 
preempt public use of the human body’s natural faculties by giving 
the patentee the right to exclude in seemingly limitless scenarios that 
involve comparing these two common metabolites and inferring that 
there is a disease.  Furthermore, future inventors would be deterred 
from experimenting with these metabolites for fear that they may 
somehow determine the metabolite levels, subconsciously infer what 
the relative levels mean, and, as a result, commit patent infringement.   
To justify patenting a diagnostic method that uses a general con-
cept, one commentator has said that a necessary calculus should be 
performed, weighing “the freedom and accessibility of knowledge and 
ideas necessary to fuel creativity, while at the same time providing 
enough proprietary control over the products of the knowledge and 
ideas to provide economic incentives.”73 If a diagnostic method      
involving a general concept was limited to a particular set of drugs or 
conditions, or limited to diagnosis of specific diseases, the general 
concept used in the method is necessarily less general and less likely 
to “preempt” all future public use.  Granting a patent on a more spe-
cialized application ensures that the general concept remains free to 
the public, while also offering enough proprietary control to maintain 
incentives to invent.  
The prevailing judicial approach to analyzing whether preemption 
of a general concept has occurred is a “holistic” utility test.74  In Dia-
  
 71 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (identifying three categorical exclusions from 
patent-eligible subject matter). 
 72 This generalized example is similar to the method patent in Lab. Corp.  
548 U.S. at 137.     
 73 See JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS 10 (2008). 
 74 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Pa-
tenting Software, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 217 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. 2006) (Diehr’s holistic approach has since replaced the 
substantive force of the previous tests for preemption). 
600 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 589]  
mond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a patent that 
applied the Arrhenius Equation to an industrial rubber curing meth-
od.
75
  The mathematical equation was limited to a specific patent-
eligible process and did not preempt all future public use of the equa-
tion.  While Diehr could have been interpreted narrowly as applying 
only to industrial methods of transforming matter, such as curing rub-
ber or molding metal, it has since been interpreted broadly,
76
 encour-
aging a finding of patent eligibility for all methods that apply general 
concepts in a limited and “‘useful’ way.”77   
The Diehr approach is more holistic than past tests for preemption 
by requiring the patented method to be analyzed as a whole, rather 
than by each separate step.  Under Diehr, it is impermissible to evalu-
ate the patent eligibility of a general concept alone once it has been 
removed from its associated steps.
78
  A critical question to ask when 
testing for preemption under Diehr is “[w]hat did applicants in-
vent?”79  In Diehr, the court found that the patentee had invented a 
useful method that applied the Arrhenius equation in a new context to 
calculate and recalculate cure time associated with rubber produc-
tion.
80
  Preemption analysis may only consider the invention as a 
whole, which makes the overall utility and “feel” of the invention 
more important.  A finding of substantial utility decreases the chance 
that a court will find preemption of a general concept and thus patent 
ineligibility. 
 
B.  An Ethical Dilemma: The Duty to Disseminate 
Treatment Information and the Duty to Treat 
 
Some diagnostic patents do more than block essential avenues of 
research—they can also be unethical.  One conflict arises from a fail-
ure to disseminate treatment information.  Physicians have an ethical 
duty to “advance scientific knowledge” by disclosing all relevant in-
formation to “patients, colleagues, and the public,” without consider-
ing financial gain.
81
  Physician patent owners who demand patent roy-
alty payments from their colleagues violate this ethical duty.   
  
 75 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177–79. 
 76 See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 216; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 77 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 217. 
 78 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. 
 79 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 80 See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 219. 
 81 AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, THE PRINCIPLES (June 
17, 2001) [hereinafter MEDICAL CODE], available at 
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1.   Dissemination of Treatment Information: The 
AMA Response & the Physician’s Immunity 
Statute 
 
The AMA has recognized the chilling effect that patents can have 
on a physician’s ethical duty to disseminate new treatment methods to 
his colleagues.  In 1992 an ophthalmologist was granted a method 
patent for performing cataract surgery without stitches.
82
  The oph-
thalmologist filed a patent infringement suit against another doctor 
who was performing a similar surgery and asked for a small licensing 
fee for each use.
83
  After the case attracted national attention, the 
AMA released a policy statement condemning such patents as con-
flicting with a physician’s duty to disseminate new medical treat-
ments.
84
  In 1996, Congress responded to the AMA’s concern by 
amending the Patent Act to include the Physician’s Immunity Stat-
ute.
85
 
While a step in the right direction, the physician’s immunity stat-
ute has not fully addressed the AMA’s concern that patents may hin-
der the dissemination of treatment information.  First, the statute only 
applies to “medical practitioners” who infringe on a patent during 
“medical activity.”86  The statute defines medical activity as any 
“medical or surgical procedure performed on a body,”87 and specifi-
cally excludes “the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnolo-
gy patent.”88  Therefore, the immunity statute does not shield medical 
professionals from liability when performing diagnostic methods.  A 
clinical laboratory physician who performs Myriad’s BRACAnalysis 
test without a license would be liable for patent infringement.
89
  
  
http://www.utcomchatt.org/docs/AMA_Code_of_Medical_Ethics.pdf; see also Cyn-
thia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 624 (2000) (explaining that the 
AMA’Medical Code of Ethics prohibits withholding knowledge for personal gain). 
 82 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037. 
 83 See Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995). 
 84 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037. 
 85 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies 
Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 789, 789 (1996); Jeff S. Rundle, The Physician’s Immunity Statute: A Botched 
Operation or a Model Procedure?, 34 J. of Corp. L. 944, 945 (2009). 
 86 Mossinghoff, supra note 85, at 789; see Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 
12, at 2037. 
 87 § 287(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 88 Id. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
 89 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037; see Association for 
Molecular Pathology, v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010).; see also Run-
dle, supra note 85, at 949–50 (2009) (“[A] physician is immune from infringement 
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Commentators
90
 and the U.S. Congress
91
 have suggested that the phy-
sician’s immunity statute should be amended to expand coverage for 
diagnostic methods. 
 
2.  The Duty to Treat in Lab. Corp.: To Commit 
Patent Infringement or Medical Malpractice?  
 
A second conflict arises from the physician’s ethical duty to “re-
gard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”92  In order to comply 
with this ethical duty, a physician must order all diagnostic tests that 
are important to a patient’s treatment.  He may also have a legal duty 
to the patient to order a test.
93
  But what if the test is patented?  Should 
the doctor have to choose between violating his duty or committing 
patent infringement?   
A Supreme Court case from 2006 has served as an ethical guide-
post for plaintiffs challenging diagnostic method patent eligibility, due 
to its strongly worded dissent.
94
  In Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite, a diag-
nostic corporation owned a method patent with two steps: (1) conduct 
a blood assay to determine homocysteine levels, and (2) infer from the 
homocysteine levels if a patent has a vitamin deficiency.
95
  After ana-
lyzing the issues, Justice Breyer and two other justices argued in dis-
sent that the diagnostic method preempted “a natural phenomenon” 
between homocysteine and vitamin levels within the human body.
96
  
  
when performing a patented surgical procedure to prevent a birth defect in a fetus.  
That same physician, however, may be subject to infringement liability for using 
genetic screening to identify a birth defect and then using gene therapy to treat the 
same condition without raising a scalpel so long as that gene is protected by a pa-
tent.”) (citation omitted). 
 90 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2040. 
 91 See Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 
3967, 107th Cong. §3 (2002).  Although it failed to pass, Section 3 of this Act would 
have exempted medical professionals that use genetic diagnostic tests from patent 
infringement. 
 92 MEDICAL CODE, supra note 81. 
 93 See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 349 A.2d 245, 253 (Md. 
1975) (holding that a physician owes a duty of care that a reasonable physician would 
provide in the same class, acting under the same or similar circumstances). 
 94 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Although this case was dismissed for an improvident grant of 
certiorari, Justice Breyer felt compelled to decide it in dissent, explaining that “those 
who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients depend 
upon proper health care might well benefit from this Court’s authoritative answer.” 
Id. at 126. 
 95 Id. at 129.  These are not the actual method claim steps.  The actual steps 
have been paraphrased for the sake of simplicity. 
 96 Id. at 135. 
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The dissenting justices did not find an overall utility in the test, and 
believed the correlation step to be impermissibly broad.
97
    
Ethical considerations consume the rest of the Lab. Corp. dissent.  
To further his argument that the diagnostic method at issue preempted 
a natural correlation, Justice Breyer stated that the method was “inva-
lid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets [the general 
concepts] doctrine.”98  He also cited public policy considerations that 
weigh against patent eligibility in this case, such as “inhibit[ing] doc-
tors from using their best medical judgment,” and “divert[ing] re-
sources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of 
searching patent files for similar simple correlations.”99  
The dilemma presented by Lab. Corp. can be summed up by an 
example.  Once a doctor orders a homocysteine assay for his patient 
from the diagnostic company, he would infringe the company’s patent 
if the results were used to diagnose a patient for vitamin deficiency.
100
  
However, in order to comply with his ethical and legal duty, a doctor 
must treat the patient to the best of his medical knowledge.  It would 
be malpractice for the doctor not to consider vitamin deficiency as a 
cause for elevated levels of homocysteine.  This is an example of the 
“legal catch-22” that currently “ensnares” physicians between one of 
two options: patent infringement or medical malpractice.
101
  
 
IV. THE EFFECT OF PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES V. MAYO 
CLINIC ON DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
 
A.   The Path to Prometheus I: Uncertainty for         
Diagnostic Method Patents 
 
In March 2008 a diagnostic method patent similar to the one up-
held in Lab. Corp. was invalidated in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California.  In Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs.,
102
 the district court analyzed whether the Prome-
theus
® 
Thiopurine Metabolites test preempted a general concept.  The 
test had three steps: (1) administration of a specific drug,
103
 (2) deter-
  
 97 See id. at 136. 
 98 Id. at 135.  The Abstract Ideas doctrine has been defined earlier as the 
exclusion of general concepts.  See supra Part III. 
 99 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138. 
 100 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2039. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200, 
2008 WL 878910, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). 
 103 Id. at *5. 
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mination of a metabolite level through a blood assay,
104
 and (3) warn-
ing
105
 the doctor to change drug dosage if the metabolite level was 
above or below threshold values defined in the patent.
106
  Applying 
Diehr’s holistic approach of preemption analysis, the district court 
held that the test as a whole encompassed no more than “correlations 
themselves.”107  The court approvingly cited Justice Breyer’s Lab. 
Corp. dissent for this proposition.  They also found the broad “infer-
ring” step in Lab. Corp. and the “warning” step in Prometheus to be 
similar.
108
  
Those worried about the future of diagnostic method patent eligi-
bility were troubled by the outcome of the district court’s Prometheus 
decision.
109
  In the face of uncertainty about how the next patent eligi-
bility case will be determined, one place to look for guidance is the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO).  In 2008 the USPTO held 
a presentation entitled “A Look at Personalized Medicine.”110  The 
presentation offered an example of one diagnostic method that was 
clearly patent ineligible,
111
 and another that should be patent eligi-
ble.
112
  The ineligible method determined whether to treat breast can-
cer, using a two-step process: (1) “considering” data, and (2) “corre-
lating” data.113  The eligible method was a treatment for breast cancer, 
consisting of three steps: (1) obtaining a sample, (2) amplifying and 
sequencing DNA isolated from the sample, and (3) treating the patient 
with a breast cancer drug.
114
  A permissible inference to make from 
this presentation is that diagnostic methods with patient treatment 
steps are more likely to be patent eligible than methods that attempt to 
  
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at *6.  
 106 Id. at *5. 
 107 Id. at *6. 
 108 Id. at *7–*8. 
 109 See Ronald I. Eisenstein & David S. Resnick, Personalized Medicine: IP 
Under Attack, PHARMACEUTICAL, MEDICAL DEVICE & LIFE SCIENCES ALERT (Jan. 
2009), 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Pharma_MedDevice_Alert
_01_20_2009.pdf. 
 110 Kathleen Bragdon, A Look at Personalized Medicine, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. 1, available at 
http://www.cabic.com/bcp/120308/KBragdon_PM.ppt (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 111 See id. at 16 (discussing “Example 3: Methods Correlating SNPs and 
Disease). 
 112 See id. at 17 (discussing “Example 4: Method of Treating Diseases that 
Correlate with SNPS”). 
 113 See id. at 16. 
 114 See id. at 17. 
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claim natural thought processes, or steps normally taken to analyze 
data in the mind.   
In September 2009, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus I
115
 re-
versed the district court’s holding of invalidity.  The appellants argued 
that the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test comprised a “method 
of treatment” despite the lack of this description in their issued pa-
tent.
116
  The Mayo Clinic argued that the Prometheus method did not 
constitute a method of treatment, and amounted to no more than a 
natural correlation, citing both the district court opinion and the Lab. 
Corp. dissent.
117
  The court sided with Prometheus, holding that the 
administering and determining steps were part of a transformative 
method of treatment and “the addition of mental steps . . . does not 
remove the prior two steps from that realm.”118 Applying Diehr’s ho-
listic approach to preemption analysis, just as the district court had 
done, the Federal Circuit found a useful method of treatment that ap-
plied a mental step.
119
  
Prometheus I has been seen as a win for diagnostic methods.
120
  
Nevertheless, this decision leaves much for concern.  What effect will 
the ethical considerations of Lab. Corp. have in the future?  The AMA 
has denounced Prometheus I for allowing a physician to become “an 
infringer as soon as she makes the mental correlation between the test 
results and the patient’s health.”121  Unfortunately, the AMA’s con-
cern has fallen on deaf ears as the Federal Circuit dismissed Justice 
Breyer’s opinion in Lab. Corp. as a nonbinding dissent.122  Also, why 
should characterizing the Prometheus
®
 Thiopurine Metabolites test as 
a method of treatment change the result?  The patented invention did 
not change between the district and circuit level.  It has always been a 
method of optimizing a drug dosage to avoid toxic side effects rather 
than a method of treatment.  
 
  
 115 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 116 The diagnostic method in Prometheus is directed to a method of optimiz-
ing thiopurine treatment and is not an obvious method of treatment on its own.  Id. at 
1340 (The preamble of claim 1 of the ‘623 patent reads “A method of optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder”). 
 117 See Brief of Appellant at 19 n.2, Prometheus Labs. Inc. v. Mayo Collabo-
rative Servs., 581 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 04-CV-1200), 2009 WL 1399726. 
 118 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1348. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See Dov Greenbaum, New Rules, Different Risk: The Changing Freedom 
to Operate Analysis for Biotechnology, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 139, 147 (2010). 
 121 Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondents at 
2, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 3199621. 
 122 See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1346, n.3 (“That dissent is not controlling 
law and also involved different claims from the ones at issue here.”). 
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B.         Bilksi v. Kappos:  A “New” Test for Patent Eligible   
Subject Matter 
 
In June 2010 the Supreme Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,
123
 revisited 
the question of patent-eligible subject matter for the first time in twen-
ty-nine years.
124
  While all the potential ramifications of this decision 
are beyond the scope of this Note,
125
 there are two parts that should 
bear on medical method patent eligibility: the Court’s distaste for per 
se exclusions,
126
 and a relaxed test for finding patent eligible subject 
matter.
127
 
In Bilski, the Court held that a business method for hedging risk 
was ineligible for a patent because it preempted, or absolutely barred, 
the public from using a general economic concept.
128
  In doing so, the 
Court also reaffirmed the importance of conducting an analysis for 
preemption of general concepts.  The court stated that investigating 
whether the public is barred from inventing with a general concept is 
preferred to creating per se exclusions for certain types of inven-
tions.
129
  This effectively keeps the subject matter inquiry broad under 
§ 101.
130
  Bilski’s emphasis on not creating per se exclusions beyond 
“laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomenon”131 means 
that it is unlikely that a diagnostic method with a mental step (such as 
“warning” or “inferring”) will be categorically barred from patent 
eligibility in the near future.  In fact, a doctrine that embraced this 
categorical “mental step” exclusion was in effect forty years ago, but 
has since been abandoned.
132
  
  
 123 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
 124 The last time the Supreme Court visited 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter 
eligibility was in Diamond v. Diehr. 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
 125 A third part of Bilski that bears on medical method patent eligibility is 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence.  See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Stevens’s concurrence may signal a shift in the approach to the pre-emption of gen-
eral concepts analysis.  Stevens writes that the majority opinion “never provide[d] a 
satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea,” and appeared to 
use an improper application of novelty and a surprising use of invention type to the 
exclusion of general concepts.  Id. at 3236.  Stevens’s remarks are directed at the 
majority’s comment that general concept exclusions should be used as a “‘tool’” to 
set “‘a set a high bar’” when considering certain types of invention.  Id. 
 126 See id. at 3228–29. 
 127 See id. at 3226–27. 
 128 See id. at 3231. 
 129 Id. at 3229. 
 130 See id. at 3229–30. 
 131 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (identifying three cate-
gorical exclusions from patent-eligible subject matter). 
 132 Before the CAFC was established, the USPTO Board of Appeals and the 
CCPA had developed the “mental steps” doctrine, which was used to deny patent 
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Bilski is also notable for relaxing the test to determine patent eli-
gible subject matter.
133
  Judicial analysis concerning patent-eligible 
subject matter is performed in two steps: (1) analyzing whether 
preemption of a general concept has occurred, and (2) applying the 
machine-or-transformation test.
134
  While the purpose of the first step 
is to find patent ineligible subject matter, the purpose of the second is 
to discover patent eligible subject matter.  The machine-or-
transformation test is satisfied when a method “(1) is tied to a particu-
lar machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”135  The Federal Circuit held that the machine-
or-transformation test was a definitive test for patent-eligible subject 
matter.
136
  The Supreme Court reversed this holding, bringing the ma-
chine-or-transformation test back to its roots as “a useful and im-
portant clue” towards finding patent eligibility, but not a dispositive 
one.
137
     
While Bilski involved a business method rather than a diagnostic 
method, the decision should have comparable force as the Federal 
Circuit formulates new limitations on diagnostic method patents.
138
  
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a dispositive machine-or-
transformation test is not fit for inventions in the “Information 
Age.”139  New inventions are increasingly sophisticated, and applying 
the same test can create uncertainty.
140
  Without providing specific 
guidance, the Court went on to say that extra considerations must be 
present when applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging 
fields such as “advanced medical diagnostic tests.”141  The Court has 
not clearly stated what these considerations are and has entrusted the 
Federal Circuit with developing them. 
  
protection for process that could be performed in the mind.  By 1970, the CCPA 
adopted a broader view of patentable subject matter and discontinued the doctrine.  
See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 197–99; see also In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (“We cannot agree . . . that . . . claims . . . are directed to non-
statutory process merely because some or all of the claims therein can also be carried 
out in . . . the human mind . . . .  All that is necessary . . . is that [a process] be in the 
technological arts.”). 
 133 See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231. 
 134 Id. at 3224. 
 135 Id. (citation omitted). 
 136 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 137 Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226–27. 
 138 Id. at 3231 (expressly inviting the Federal Circuit to formulate new limita-
tions on patentability). 
 139 Id. at 3227. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  The Court states that application of the machine-or-transformation test 
to emerging technologies will pose questions of “intricacy and refinement.”  Id. 
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C.   Prometheus II: A Second Win for Diagnostic 
Method Patents  
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Prometheus case in 
light of Bilski’s change in rules for patent eligibility.142  The Prome-
theus I decision was vacated and the case was remanded to the Federal 
Circuit.
143
  All eyes were on the Federal Circuit to interpret the Bilski 
decision and impose extra limitations on medical method patents.  
Many commentators believed that satisfying the machine-or-
transformation test would serve as a safe harbor for patent eligibil-
ity.
144
  Others expected the Federal Circuit to come up with a new 
test.
145
 
On December 17, 2010, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II reaf-
firmed its previous decision and allayed the fears of those concerned 
about the future of diagnostic method patents.
146
  Noticeably swayed 
by the purported utility of Prometheus Thiopurines Metabolites test,
147
 
the court held that as a whole “Prometheus has claimed therapeutic 
methods that determine the optimal dosage level for a course of treat-
ment . . . [in] a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficiency 
and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases 
using particular drugs.”148  Once again, the court found that Prome-
theus’ test constituted a method of treatment, despite a lack of such 
information in the method steps.  The court was unpersuaded by Mayo 
Clinic’s argument that the first two steps—(1) administration of a 
drug, and (2) determination of metabolite concentration through a 
  
 142 Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Eric K. Steffe & Michelle H. Holoubek, Diagnostic Testing in the 
Wake of Bilski v. Kappos, IPWATCHDOG (July 2, 2010, 1:15 PM), 
http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/02/diagnostic-testing-in-the-wake-of-bilski-v-
kappos/id=11474/; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organiza-
tion et al. in Support of Neither Party at 32, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-
964), 2009 WL 2418478. 
 145 Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Catching a Breath After Bilski, PHARMAPATENTS 
(June 28, 2010), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/101/catching-a-breath-after-
bilksi/ (“On remand, the Federal Circuit is likely to decide whether these types of 
methods cannot be patented because they claim a phenomenon of nature or abstract 
idea.  In doing so, the court may formulate a new test for the patent-eligibility of 
diagnostic and personalized medicine methods.”). 
 146 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 147 Kevin E. Noonan, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services (Fed. Cir. 2010), PATENT DOCS (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/12/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayo-
collaborative-services-fed-cir-2010.html. 
 148 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1359. 
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blood assay—are not “method of treatment claims no matter how 
many times Prometheus repeats its Newspeak-like drumbeat that they 
are.”149 
In holding that the machine-or-transformation test had been satis-
fied, the court stated that “methods of treatment . . . are always trans-
formative when one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the 
body to ameliorate effects of an undesired condition.”150  The court 
seemingly created a per se eligibility for methods of treatment involv-
ing drugs, which may be contrary to Bilski’s guidance that the rules 
for patent eligibility should be relaxed and take into account new con-
siderations.
151
  The court went on to say that the district court erred 
when characterizing the first two steps as mere “data-gathering steps,” 
rather than as transformative steps that are “a significant part” of the 
diagnostic method.
152
  What makes the first two steps a significant 
part of the method and not the last?  The court attempted to justify 
their significance based on the purpose of each step,
153
 however the 
argument is not entirely convincing.
154
    
 
D.   The Aftermath of Prometheus II: A Limited     
Application or a Further Broadening of Patent         
Eligible Subject Matter? 
 
One commentator believes the Federal Circuit made a “danger-
ously subjective” policy argument in Prometheus II.155  The danger 
presented by the court’s opinion is that subjectivity may taint the fu-
ture of diagnostic method patent eligibility by giving undue weight to 
an invention’s ability to serve as a patient treatment method.  Are 
Prometheus’ claims really drawn towards method of treatment, and 
should all methods of treatment be transformative?  The purpose of 
the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test is to optimize treatment 
by administering a drug and determining metabolite levels through an 
assay, which is arguably a diagnostic method that affects a method of 
treatment rather than actually being a method of treatment itself.  Can 
  
 149 Supp. Brief of Defendants-Appellees to Address the Effect of Bilski at 4, 
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 
2008-1403). 
 150 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1356 (emphasis added). 
 151 See Bilski v, Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010). 
 152 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1357. 
 153 See id. 
 154 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions 
After Bilski, Prometheus and Myriad, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 393, 400 (2011) 
(citation omitted). 
 155 See Noonan, supra note 147. 
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any diagnostic method that administers a drug to the human body for 
treatment satisfy the test for transformation?  The Federal Circuit 
seems to go too far in Prometheus.
156
  Subjective evaluations of utility 
and treatment may be given too much weight in overcoming clear 
arguments against patent eligibility. 
Inquiring into the USPTO’s guidelines may also help to explain 
the outcome in Prometheus.  After Bilski, the USPTO issued Interim 
Guidelines for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility.
157
  The guide-
lines state that § 101 “is merely a coarse filter and . . . only a threshold 
question for patentability.”158  This would indicate a broad scope for 
eligible subject matter and a greater reliance on the other patent stat-
utes to negate patentability.
159
  The Federal Circuit in Prometheus II 
may not be saying that all methods of treatment using a drug should 
receive a patent, but rather that diagnostic methods should not be in-
validated at the eligibility level.  The other statutory provisions offer a 
better way to filter out inventions that hinder innovation rather than 
promote it.
160
  
 
V. A REDEFINED TEST FOR TRANSFORMATION   
 
Despite Bilski’s change to the application of the machine-or-
transformation test, the Federal Circuit seemed to apply the test iden-
tically in Prometheus I and II.
161
  One concern is whether the Federal 
Circuit has formulated extra considerations for the machine-or-
transformation test, which in its previous form was ill-suited for “ad-
vanced medical diagnostic tests.”162  Another is whether any method 
  
 156 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, STAN. L. REV 1315, 1344 
(2011) (“The Federal Circuit’s analysis . . . would allow too much.”). 
 157 Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process 
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
Interim Guide]. 
 158 Interim Guide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,926. 
 159 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112. 
 160 For example, if the patent document does not adequately disclose how to 
make and use the invention, which is required under the enablement requirement of 
35 U.S.C. § 112, the public cannot replicate and improve upon the invention, and 
therefore do not benefit from issuance of a patent.  Such a patent does not foster inno-
vation and should not be granted.  See also Interim Guide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43926 
(“Sections 102, 103, and 112 are typically the primary tools for evaluating patentabil-
ity unless the claim is truly abstract . . . .”). 
 161 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). (“We similarly 
reaffirm that the treatment methods claimed in Prometheus’s patents in suit satisfy the 
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test . . . .”). 
 162 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).  The Court in Bilski stated 
that applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging technologies will pose 
questions of “intricacy and refinement.”  Id. 
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that treats a patient through administration of a drug can satisfy the 
transformation prong.  
To provide needed clarity in applying the machine-or-
transformation test to medical diagnostic tests, the transformation 
prong should be redefined.  The redefined test for transformation al-
lows for a more nuanced application of the current framework without 
adding unnecessary limitations or per se exclusions.
163
  Redefining the 
test for transformation is preferable to using new tests for patent eligi-
bility,
164
 as it builds on the current analytical framework and adds just 
enough additional inquiry to define “the line between a patentable 
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle . . . .’”165   
Unlike the work of prominent scholars in the field, the redefined 
test is not a test for creating presumptive subject matter exclusions,
166
 
or a test that attempts to justify patent eligibility in view of overall 
utility.
167
  This redefined test for transformation challenges our per-
ception of which scientific contributions involving natural pathways 
are truly inventive, as opposed to those that are mere observations or 
discoveries of a preexisting natural process.  While this is not explicit-
ly a sui generis test for transformative diagnostic methods, it is partic-
ularly useful for analyzing the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods 
involving a multi-step physiological process (e.g., administering a 
drug to a patient so that it may be broken down by the body, or ex-
tracting a sample from the patient and analyzing the result). 
 
A. A Proposed Test 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
The redefined test for transformation test is satisfied by: 
  
 163 A redefinition of our current framework is preferable to proposing addi-
tional limitations.  When new limitations are proposed, they must be aggregated with 
old ones to remain relevant.  A redefined test does not suffer from this aggregation 
effect.  
 164 One such test involves a determination of the patent eligibility of differing 
mental steps.  See Andrew W. Torrance, Neurobiology and Patenting Thought, 50 
IDEA 27, 28 (2009).  Dr. Torrance proposes that certain method patents containing 
unbounded mental steps could impose involuntary liability and should be presump-
tively ineligible for patenting.  Id.  By contrast, mental steps that can be controlled 
within the mind are better suited patent eligibility.  Id.  See Lemley et al., supra note 
154, at 1317, 1346 (proposing a “§ 101 overclaiming test” that renders a claim patent-
ineligible when its scope is overly broad relative to its practical application). 
 165 Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)). 
 166 See Torrance, supra note 164, at 28. 
 167 See Lemley et al., supra note 156, at 1317, 1329.  
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A more than predictable transformation of an article into a differ-
ent state or thing, wherein an article is a particular substance that is 
smaller than the human body and is sufficiently removed from nature.  
If the article is extracted from the human body, rather than provided 
by an outside source, it must be imperceptible and assayable.   
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
The proposed test for transformation tends towards different out-
comes depending on whether an article is provided to the body from 
an outside source, for example, the administration of a drug, or an 
extraction from the body for subsequent analysis.  The Prometheus 
Thiopurine Metabolites test involves both the administration of a drug 
to a patient and a subsequent determination step that measures the 
concentration of a metabolite (product of drug breakdown).  Myriad’s 
BRACAnalysis test forgoes the initial drug administration step and 
begins by extracting genetic samples from human tissue, then compar-
ing and analyzing them.
168
  Administration of a drug to the human 
body presents unique concerns as the natural pathways acting on the 
administered drug are inherently transformative.   Mere observation of 
an inherent transformation seems too simplistic, and entirely non-
inventive, to constitute a patent eligible process on its own.
169
  By 
contrast, determination steps performed on articles that have been 
extracted from the body often require sophisticated transformative 
steps in order to take them out of their natural bodily habitat and ana-
lyze the result.
170
 
The following subsections will explain the redefined test for trans-
formation, beginning with the more than predictable requirement.  
This feature highlights what has already been considered by the Court 
when evaluating the inventive jump required for a patent eligible pro-
cess,
171
 and now makes it an express requirement for transformation.  
  
 168 USPTO v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 169 Dan Hoang, Note, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Clinic’s Gift to the 
Biotech Industry: A Study of Patent-Eligibility of Medical Treatment and Diagnostic 
Methods After Bilski, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 457, 470–71 (2011). 
 170 While there are inherently transformative natural pathways for extracting 
an article, e.g. urination, extraction of a particular genetic sequence or metabolite 
often requires sophisticated technical tests that cannot be performed without human 
intervention.  
 171 The Supreme Court has considered whether natural products continue to 
function in their normal predictable way during their patent eligibility analysis.  See, 
e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., in which the Court stated: 
“Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can 
be mixed without harmful effect to the properties of either . . . is no more than the 
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The more than predictable standard arguably provides the greatest 
“teeth” to the defined test for transformation.       
 
B. Raising the Transformation Barrier: The “More 
Than Predictable” Standard  
 
The current machine-or-transformation test is silent on the form or 
amount of transformation required.  In the physiology and pathology 
fields, which routinely use diagnostic methods, the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) defines transformation as “change of form or sub-
stance in an organ, tissue, [or] vital fluid.”172  This definition would 
suggest that a transformation can occur within a region as large as a 
bodily organ or as small as an extracted vital fluid sample.  While 
vital fluid in the aggregate is quite large, this definition is not limited 
to a specific amount of vital fluid.  Transformation is also defined in 
the OED as “a complete change in character [or] condition.”173  A 
“complete” transformation requirement would likely be hard to prove 
or satisfy.    
A compromise between complete transformation, which may be 
too hard to prove, and no transformation requirement, which could 
allow for incremental changes in form, would be a more than predict-
able transformation.  A more than predictable requirement should be 
imposed on diagnostic methods to prevent the patenting of obvious 
tests that apply common drugs to natural pathways with known chem-
ical reactivities.  Natural pathways are inherently transformative and 
predictably alter the composition of the drugs they encounter.  While 
the addition of a common drug to a well-known pathway may be   
novel, it would not be inventive, as it would constitute a transfor-
mation no greater than those inherent within natural pathways,     
transformative properties that are “free to all men and reserved exclu-
  
discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.  The ag-
gregation of select strains of the several species into one product is an application of 
that newly-discovered natural principle.  But however ingenious the discovery of 
that natural principle may have been, the application of it is hardly more than an 
advance in the packaging of the inoculants.  Each of the species of root-nodule bac-
teria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it 
always infected.  No species acquires a different use.  The combination of species 
produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlarge-
ment of the range of their utility.  Each species has the same effect it always had.  
The bacteria perform in their natural way.  Their use in combination does not im-
prove in any way their natural functioning.  They serve the ends nature originally 
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”  
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 172 Oxford English Dictionary, Online Edition, available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204743 (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
 173 Id. 
614 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 589]  
sively to none.”174   Patenting the addition of common drugs to natural 
pathways provides little benefit to society, as it serves mainly to block 
future inventors from utilizing the inherent transformative properties 
of natural pathways for practical applications.
175
    
 
1. Scholarly Support for the More Than       
Predictable Standard 
 
Commentators have recognized the need to incorporate a measure 
of creativity
176
 or technical sophistication
177
 into patent eligibility 
analysis, particularly for products incorporating natural phenomena or 
methods involving natural pathways.  There are substantial incentives 
to seek patents on applications of the human body’s natural pathways, 
such as the NF-KB pathway involved in the expression of numerous 
genes, and other vital signaling pathways at the crossroads of meta-
bolic function.
178
  As a result, we can expect disputes over patent eli-
gibility to continue.  To avoid the dangers inherent in subjective as-
sessments of utility or treatment ability to support patent eligibility, as 
seen in Prometheus I and II, one commentator has suggested drawing 
the patent eligibility line between technological innovations and mere 
discoveries of natural phenomena.
179
  She argues that technical inno-
vations are more likely to maintain traditional incentives to invent 
than simple discoveries of natural processes, which are likely already 
in the public domain and should remain there.
180
  
  
 174 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 175 The district court in Prometheus found that alternate uses of the natural 
phenomenon associated with the Thiopurine Metabolites Test were not practical uses.  
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200, 2008 WL 
878910, at *1, *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).  There was no way to use the natural 
phenomenon according to the claims without infringing on Prometheus’ patent.  See 
id. 
 176 See Sarnoff, supra note 154, at 417; see also Shengfeng Chen, Note, 
Pathways to Patents: Applying the Written Description Requirement Doctrine to 
Patents on Biological Pathways, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 559, 561 (2008) 
(claiming biological functionality through “reach-through” patents may “cast shad-
ows on future developments”). 
 177 Elizabeth I. Winston, The Technological Edge, 3 AKRON INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2011). 
 178 See Chen, supra note 176, at 564 (“Such biological pathways are perfect 
candidates for functional claiming”). 
 179 Winston, supra note 177, at 17. 
 180 Id. (“The greater the technology required to discover problems in the art, 
the less likely it is that such problems have already been discovered, and the greater 
the benefit to the public of disclosing such problems and their solutions through the 
patent system.”).  There is language from the Supreme Court in Funk Bros to support 
the proposition that mere discoveries of natural principles are not inventive and are 
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These commentators’ suggestions to raise the patent eligibility 
threshold support, at least to some degree, the creation of a more than 
predictable requirement.  However, unlike these commentators, I am 
suggesting that the more than predictable requirement should define 
the level of transformation required in the transformation test, rather 
than serve as an extra consideration during preemption analysis.  
Diehr’s “holistic” approach, which is used to analyze patent eligibility 
in addition to the machine-or-transformation test, already suffers from 
its own measure of subjectivity, as seen in Prometheus I and II.  Ana-
lyzing the predictability of a method during transformation places a 
requirement where one is noticeably absent and lends itself to better 
resolutions of unclear patent eligibility cases.
181
    
 
2. Judicial Support for the More than           
Predictable Standard: Judge Moore’s      
Classen Dissent  
 
On August 31, 2011, the Federal Circuit in Classen Immunother-
apies v. Biogen Idec (Classen II)
182
 reversed its previous holding
183
 
that a method for immunizing a patient that lowers the risk of chronic 
immune-mediated diseases was ineligible for patenting.  Classen’s 
patent claims called for (1) screening a plurality of immunization 
schedules, and (2) immunizing a patient according to a subject im-
munization schedule.
184
  The court held that the principles upheld in 
Prometheus II, specifically “claims to methods of treatment . . . are 
always transformative when one group of a defined group of drugs is 
administered to the body,” supported the patent eligibility of Classen’s 
transformative claims.
185
  The Court did not engage in any specific 
analysis as to why immunizing a patient, as called for in step two of 
Classen’s claims, was in fact transformative.  The Court also cited 
with approval Bilski’s guidance that § 101 is only a “threshold test” 
and that substantive conditions of patentability (i.e., § 102 (novelty) 
  
therefore ineligible for patenting.  See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, at 132 (“There is no 
way in which we could call [this combination inventive] unless we borrowed inven-
tion from the discovery of the natural principle itself.”). 
 181 The current machine-or-transformation test does not define the amount of 
transformation required - it is simply “transformation” of an article into a different 
state or thing.  See supra Part V.B. 
 182 Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 183 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 Fed.Appx. 866, 867 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 184 Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1060–61. 
 185 Id. at 1068 (citing Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
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and § 103 (non-obviousness)) should remain legally and practically 
distinct.
186
 
In a lengthy dissent reminiscent of Justice Breyer in Lab. Corp., 
Judge Moore criticized the majority for not analyzing why Classen’s 
claims were transformative.  She went on to say that Classen’s claims 
“are not directed to any specific treatment steps or drugs or even any 
specific chronic immune disorder.”187  Judge Moore felt that the intent 
and effect of Classen’s claims were to stop others from using a natural 
principle and destroy incentives to invent, citing approvingly Justice 
Breyer’s Lab. Corp. dissent.188  She also indicated that any doctor 
who wished to fulfill his or her duty to a patient by comparing patient 
immunization schedules would also infringe Classen’s claims,189 leav-
ing a choice between medical malpractice and patent infringement.
190
    
Judge Moore’s dissent can be read to support the more than pre-
dictable requirement.  Disagreeing with the majority’s analysis under 
§ 101, Judge Moore proclaimed that “Classen did not invent the im-
munological response measured in his claim, and the discovery of this 
phenomenon alone ‘cannot support a patent unless there is some other 
inventive concept in its application.’”191  Judge Moore’s distinction 
between mere discoveries of natural phenomena and a more inventive 
contribution supports the concept of a higher patent eligibility thresh-
old, similar to the suggestions of academic commentators.
192
  While 
she does not explicitly endorse a more than predictable transformation 
requirement, her analysis suggests that the court has applied the hold-
ing of Prometheus too broadly and has reduced the § 101 threshold to 
an untenable minimum.  A heightened standard for transformation 
could address both of Judge Moore’s concerns.   
 
3. The Distinction between Predictability and 
Obviousness 
 
Critics of the more than predictable requirement would argue that 
it conflates § 103, the statutory nonobvious requirement, with patent-
  
 186 Id. at 1064. 
 187 Id. at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 188 Id. at 1079 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 125, 127–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
dismissal of petition)). 
 189 Id. at 1078-79 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 190 This is yet another example of the legal “catch-22” explained supra Part 
III.B.2. 
 191 Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1079 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 
(1978)). 
 192 See supra Part V.B.1. 
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able subject matter analysis under § 101.  They would also argue that 
such a combined analysis of patent statutes is contrary to the approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Bilski and the Federal Circuit in 
Classen.
193
  However, the courts and the USPTO have clearly differ-
entiated between what is “predictable” and what is “obvious.”194   
Patent Examiners at the UPSTO are required to follow the Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) when evaluating a patent.  
MPEP § 2144.08 states that “[o]bviousness does not require absolute 
predictability; however, at least some degree of predictability is re-
quired.”195  When a court determines if a claimed feature is obvious, it 
only needs to find evidence of “reasonable expectation of success,”196 
whereas “predictability” suggests something more.  Methods that are 
predictable are undoubtedly obvious, however methods that are obvi-
ous are not necessarily predictable.    
By setting the transformation requirement at more than predicta-
ble, we only inquire as to whether a natural pathway involved in a 
method claim is so well-known and documented that the end state of 
an article involved in a transformation is entirely predictable.  By de-
fining the requirement this narrowly, natural pathways that are firmly 
planted in the public domain are withheld from patent eligibility, 
while those that are less well-known remain free for commercial de-
velopment and patenting.   
 
C. The Remaining Elements of the Proposed Test 
 
To explain the remaining elements incorporated into the language 
of the proposed test, I will compare the Prometheus decisions, which 
involved a transformative method of optimizing thiopurine treatment, 
with Classen I,
197
 in which the court held that a method for optimizing 
an immunization schedule was not transformative.
198
  These elements 
reiterate important distinctions that the Federal Circuit has already 
drawn when analyzing the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods. 
 
 
   
  
 193 Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1064. 
 194 MANUEL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.08(II)(A)(4)(e) (8th 
ed. 2001). 
 195 In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1053–54 (CCPA 1976). 
 196 In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 197 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec (Classen I), No. WDQ-04-
2607, 2006 WL 6161856 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 866 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 198 See Classen I, 2006 WL 6161856 at *5-6. 
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1.   An Article Smaller Than the Human Body 
 
The redefined test for transformation should be limited to a de-
fined range of articles.  Prometheus I and II show that there is confu-
sion about what constitutes a sufficient article for transformation.  In 
Prometheus I and II, the Federal Circuit held that the first two steps—
(1) administering a particular drug, and (2) determining the optimal 
level of metabolites—satisfied the transformation test.199  While the 
court seemed to identify the drug as the “particular article” and the 
metabolites as “a different state or thing,” they actually identified an-
other article.  The court found a sufficient transformation “of the hu-
man body following administration of a drug and the various chemical 
and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites.”200  The fact that the 
court found both the human body and metabolites to be transformed is 
shocking, as the human body is not usually considered an article.  The 
human body is much larger than a drug, organ, or other physical sub-
division we might consider observing for a transformation.
201
 
Comparison of the Prometheus decisions and Classen I shows that 
transformation of the human body is not sufficient for a finding of 
transformation.  The Court in Classen I did not find the human body 
to be a transformed article,
202
 as did the court in Prometheus.  Howev-
er, a transformation of the human body would have occurred after 
administration of a vaccine.  Injection of a vaccine triggers the human 
immune system response and changes the body to “a different state or 
thing.”203  The court in Classen I did not see this change in the body 
as sufficient for overall transformation.  While the recent decision in 
Classen II upholding patent eligibility may cast this conclusion into 
doubt, there is no indication in the majority opinion of what exactly is 
being transformed, whether the human body or the injected vaccine.
204
    
Regardless of the court’s hidden intent in Classen II, transfor-
mation of the human body alone should never be sufficient for a find-
ing of transformation.
205
  This would imply that any process that 
  
 199 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 200 Id. (emphasis added). 
 201 See supra Part V.B (identifying the OED definition of “transformation”). 
 202 See generally Classen I, 2006 WL 6161856 (The opinion does not mention 
transformation of the body alone, although the body is arguably being transformed 
after vaccine injection). 
 203 Id. at 3225 (citation omitted). 
 204 See Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing) (“None of this [transformation] analysis exists in the majority opinion here in 
Classen.”). 
 205 Transformation should be limited to an article introduced into a process, 
rather than the surroundings the article is placed into.  At a certain level of abstrac-
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changes the state of the human body would satisfy the transformation 
test, an important clue towards finding patent eligibility.  Any immun-
ization, blood sample extraction, or mild invasion of the body would 
theoretically satisfy the transformation test if this was the current state 
of the law.
206
 
 
2.  The Article Should Be Particular and         
Sufficiently Removed from Nature 
 
The second conclusion reached by comparing the Prometheus de-
cisions and Classen I is that the administered article must be particu-
lar.  Prometheus I explicitly states that methods of treating the human 
body are always transformative when administering a particular 
drug.
207
  Classen I points out the lack of a “particular vaccine”208 in 
the vaccination process.  The “particular” limitation seen in both cases 
is reasonable, as diagnostic methods tied to unique articles are less 
likely to preempt the use of natural pathways.  “Particular” means, for 
example, a patented drug, or a defined class of chemotherapy drugs.  
A non-particular drug would mean, for example, a pain pill, a cough 
drop, or a general vaccine.  In Classen II, the majority opinion’s ne-
glect of this “particular” limitation was pointed out in Judge Moore’s 
dissent.
209
  
Comparison of the Prometheus decisions and Classen I also raises 
new questions.  Is there something inherently different between ad-
ministration of a synthetic drug and a vaccine that would justify patent 
protection for the former and not the latter?  Two differences are 
worth noting.  A drug is typically an unnatural substance that chemi-
cally breaks down into metabolites that can be viewed through an 
assay.  A vaccine is typically comprised of killed or weakened natural 
  
tion, any number of articles could be transformed within a process. See Kevin E. 
Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility, 
PATENTLYO (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/09/an-initial-
comment-on-prometheus-the-irrelevance-of-intangibility-1.html. 
 206 This could occur during either an “administration” step or a “determina-
tion” step. 
 207 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 208 Classen I, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 
2006), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 209 Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1078 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“No limitations exist 
on the type of drug to immunize with, the schedules that should be used for the im-
munization, the type of chronic immune disorder to look for, or any limitation on the 
control group.”). 
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microbes
210
 that stimulate white blood cells and cause them to prolif-
erate.
211
  Does it matter whether an article is entirely natural or syn-
thetic, or how the article breaks down once inside the body?    
Rather than emphasizing the distinction between natural and syn-
thetic, the analysis should focus on whether the drug is sufficiently 
removed from nature.  Vaccines contain a small amount of protein 
from a virus, however that protein is inactive and isolated though a 
technological intervention.
212
  If a vaccine is sufficiently isolated to 
the point that it becomes different “not just in degree, but in kind,” 
then that would normally be enough to tie it to a patent eligible meth-
od.
213
   
Regarding the mechanism of article breakdown, the court found 
both the synthetic drug in Prometheus II and the partially natural vac-
cine in Classen II to be transformative.
214
  The Classen II court did 
not provide any details indicating that article breakdown mechanism 
is important.    
 
3.   Imperceptible and Assayable 
 
During a “determination step,” patent eligibility favors articles 
that were once imperceptible, or could not be seen, and subsequently 
become perceptible through an assay.  In Prometheus I, the court stat-
ed that “determining the levels of [the metabolites] 6-TG or 6-MMP 
in a subject necessarily involves a transformation, for those levels 
cannot be determined by mere inspection.”215  The court presumed 
that “some form of manipulation”216 is required to make an object that 
  
 210 Vaccines: What is a Vaccine?, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES, 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/vaccines/understanding/Pages/whatVaccine.aspx 
(last updated Aug. 18, 2008); see also Winston, supra note 177, at 6. 
 211 DONALD VOET, JUDITH VOET, AND CHARLOTTE PRATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
BIOCHEMISTRY: LIFE AT THE MOLECULAR LEVEL 209-10 (Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3rd ed. 
2008) [hereinafter VOET & VOET]. 
 212 See Vaccines: What is a Vaccine?, supra note 210. 
 213 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (purified adrenaline so superior to previous adrenal gland ex-
tracts so as to be distinct not in degree, but in kind).  The method of injecting a vac-
cine however would still need to meet the more than predictable standard of trans-
formation.  It’s arguably very predictable to immunize the human body with an anti-
gen during vaccination test, as the immunization relies on the inherent response of the 
human body to the introduction of a foreign agent. 
 214 See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see Classen 
II, 659 F.3d at 1068. 
 215 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 216 Id.  
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cannot be seen into one that is visible.  This indicates that visualiza-
tion is a distinguishing feature of transformed articles in a determina-
tion claim.  If an article was always visible, it is hard to imagine how 
extraction from the body would change it into a different state or 
thing. 
 
D. Application of the Proposed Test: Diagnostic 
Methods in Recent Federal Circuit Cases 
 
To consider what a more than predictable transformation would 
entail, one could start with three common factors used in establishing 
the level of ordinary skill in an art.
217
  Such factors include (1) “the 
types of problems [normally] encountered in the art,” (2) “the sophis-
tication of the technology [involved]”, and (3) the educational back-
ground of those working in the field.
218
  These factors will be consid-
ered in applying the proposed test to the Federal Circuit’s recent Pro-
metheus II,
219
 Classen II,
220
 and Myriad
221
 opinions.  
 
1. Prometheus II 
 
Application of the proposed test to Prometheus II leads to the 
same result as the Federal Circuit, but for different reasons.  The ini-
tial step, “administration” of the drug to a patient, is properly viewed 
as a predictable transformation.  The human body’s natural pathway 
for metabolizing mercaptopurines and thiopurine nucleotides was well 
known to scientists and the medical profession at the time the Prome-
theus Thiopurine Metabolites test was patented.
222
  The drugs were 
commonly known for treating cancer and gastrointestinal disease.  
The toxic byproducts of these drugs during patient metabolism were 
also well known to those skilled in the field.
223
  Any transformation 
undergone by the drugs would rely on the inherent reactivity of, for 
example, the gastrointestinal tract in converting them into metabolites.  
Therefore it is not an inventive application.    
  
 217 See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, AIPLA’S MODEL PATENT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 7.3 (2008), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/other-
pubs/documents/2008_03_27_AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.pdf. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 220 Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 221 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 222 See Sarnoff, supra note 154, at 401. 
 223 Id. 
622 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 589]  
The subsequent “determination” step, however, undergoes a more 
than predictable transformation.  Measuring the level of thiopurine 
metabolites requires extraction of a human sample, such as red blood 
cells, and sophisticated techniques to determine the concentration of 
6-Mercaptopurine (6-MP) metabolites.
224
  The results of the assay are 
not predictable—and that’s the very reason this assay is being per-
formed.  There is no natural pathway for extracting red blood cells 
containing 6-MP that shows the predictability of this determination 
method.  The 6-MP metabolites are initially unnoticeable and are sub-
sequently visible only after an assay.           
The proposed test would therefore favor a finding of patent eligi-
bility through a sufficient transformation at the determination step.  
However, two other points are worth noting.  First, contrary to the 
Federal Circuit’s findings, transformation of the human body during 
administration of the drug or during the determination of 6-MP me-
tabolite levels would not be sufficient for transformation.  Second, one 
could argue that an individual’s metabolic response to common 
chemotherapy drugs is variable, especially in this application, and 
therefore the administered drug is more than predictably transformed.  
However, every natural pathway operates at varying levels of effi-
ciency depending on the individual and their health.  To justify patent 
eligibility over established natural pathways due to unforeseen natural 
variations in activity would elevate formal distinctions over actual 
effect—which blocks others from exploring the same natural pathway.   
    
2. Classen II  
 
Application of the proposed test to Classen II would lead to a re-
versal of the Federal Circuit’s decision.  Echoing the concerns of 
Judge Moore in dissent, Classen’s immunization step involves the 
predictable transformation of a vaccine to a proliferated immune re-
sponse.  Classen borrowed the inventive concept inherent within a 
natural immune response, which is not rightfully theirs to claim.  Nat-
ural processes such as immune responses reside firmly within the pub-
lic domain, and any attempt to claim them would hinder researchers 
and doctors from performing everyday tasks. 
Unlike the patent at issue in Prometheus, Classen’s patent claim 
involves only an “administration” step and lacks a “determination” 
step.  The inherent change in the human body after immunization is 
also not sufficient to support a finding of transformation.  Therefore, 
the proposed test would favor a finding of patent ineligibility. 
  
 224 See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 at [9] (filed Apr. 8, 1999). 
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3. Myriad 
 
In the case of Myriad, application of the proposed test leads to the 
same result as the Federal Circuit, and for the same reasons.  Since 
Myriad’s BRACAnalysis test does not involve an “administration” 
step, the proposed test for transformation would normally focus on a 
“determination” step.  However, Myriad’s patent claims do not in-
clude a determination step.
225
  Their patent claims include only “com-
paring” and “analyzing” nucleotide sequences.  Therefore, these 
claims attempt to control natural mental faculties that are firmly with-
in the public domain.   
If Myriad had claimed a “determination step,” which their kit is 
designed for, this step would have involved a more than predictable 
transformation of a human tissue sample into a purified and amplified 
gene segment.  This gene segment would subsequently be used for 
comparisons between genes located within tumor and non-tumor sam-
ples after processing.
226
  In order to make this comparison, the gene 
segments must be purified through sophisticated DNA isolation meth-
ods and extended through molecular medicine techniques.  These 
steps transform the genes by taking what is hidden within the body 
and manipulating it into something markedly different from its natural 
state.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Note has discussed how to clarify the elusive line between 
patentable processes and unpatentable principles by redefining the 
existing machine-or-transformation test.  Application of the redefined 
test for transformation to current diagnostic method patent cases could 
prevent the Federal Circuit from expanding the broad principles up-
held in Prometheus—seemingly per se eligibility for diagnostic meth-
ods drawn towards treatment of the human body—to future patent 
eligibility determinations.  The redefined test may also be useful to 
fight the Federal Circuit’s recent tendency to lower the § 101 thresh-
  
 225 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357 (“Myriad’s claims, in 
contrast, do not include the step of ‘determining’ the sequence of BRCA genes by, 
e.g., isolating the genes from a blood sample and sequencing them, or any other nec-
essarily transformative step.”). 
 226 See Brief for the Appellants at 55, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4600106.  Ex-
traction generally refers to gene isolation and amplification techniques.  See VOET, 
VOET & PRATT, supra note 209, at 62–65. Processed generally refers to nucleotide 
sequencing.  See id. at 53–55.  
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old to minimal levels.  A lowered § 101 threshold has arguably un-
dermined traditional incentives to invent.
227
   
The Supreme Court delivered its decision in Prometheus III
228
 
sometime after completion of this Note.  The Court reversed and held 
the patent claims to be invalid.
229
  Justice Breyer authored the majori-
ty opinion and cited with approval many of the issues raised in his 
dissent from the 2006 Lab. Corp. decision.
230
   While a full analysis of 
this decision is beyond the scope of this Note, I would like to briefly 
mention that the opinion arguably supports the proposed redefined test 
for transformation.
231
  While such adoption is not explicit, and other 
aspects of the opinion may instruct against a more searching transfor-
mation test requirement,
232
 the Supreme Court recognized that addi-
tional analysis under §101 is appropriate to avoid the unintended ef-
fect of diagnostic method patents in blocking critical avenues of re-
search and treatment. 
    
  
227  While a lower patent threshold makes it easier to obtain an exclusive right 
and therefore may increase traditional incentives to invent, the lowered threshold may 
also unduly interfere with the free flow of information by allowing for the creation of 
too many exclusive rights.  See Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
228 Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
229 Id. at 1305. 
230 See, e.g., id. at 1302 (discussing how Prometheus’ patent claims “tie up the 
doctor’s subsequent treatment decision” as well as inhibit the development of “later 
discovered processes that measure metabolite levels in new ways.”) 
 231 The Court’s quick dismissal of Prometheus’ claims as involving inade-
quate transformations, acknowledgment that subject matter eligibility analysis under 
§101 may involve overlapping concepts of novelty or obviousness, and detailed dis-
cussion regarding an “inventive concept” may support the proposed redefined test for 
transformation.  See, e.g., id. at 1289 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the signifi-
cance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 nov-
elty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”); id. at 1303 (finding the “administering” step 
in Prometheus’ claims to be an irrelevant transformation, and the second “determin-
ing” step to be “satisfied without transforming the blood, should science develop a 
totally different system for determining metabolite levels that did not involve such a 
transformation.”); id. at 1290, 1292, 1294, 1299, 1300 (discussing the importance of 
an “inventive concept”).   
 232 See id. at 1289 (The Court cautions against mixing inquiries of novelty and 
obviousness in subject matter eligibility analysis under §101).  
